Physicalism and New-Wave-Reductionism by Beckermann, Ansgar
Physicalism and New-Wave-Reductionism*
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (2001), 257-261.
Ansgar Beckermann
University of Bielefeld
In his book Psychoneural Reduction – The New Wave John Bickle takes up a question that in-
deed deserved fresh consideration for quite some time – the question of whether psychology can
be reduced to neurobiology. Of course, Bickle is right. In the last twenty years the general debate
about the concept of theory reduction led to a lot of new insights. It should have been natural to
reconsider the old discussion based on Nagel’s concept of reduction in the light of more recent
views. With Bickle I believe that Hooker’s contributions, in particular, have substantially ad-
vanced the general debate.1 However, I am less convinced that structuralism provides the most
suitable framework for a reformulation of a general concept of reduction. I also wholeheartedly
agree with Bickle that the idea of nonreductive physicalism is incoherent – especially if one tries
to spell it out entirely in terms of supervenience.2 We disagree, however, on the crucial question
of what physicalism amounts to.
Bickle does not pursue the question of whether psychology is reducible to neurobiology for its
own sake. Rather, in his view this question lies at the core of the mind-body problem. Tradition-
ally, he concedes, the philosophical mind-body problem is ontological. It concerns questions
like “What is the nature of mind?”, “Are mental phenomena identical with physical phenom-
ena?”, “Or is the mind something more than just a physical phenomenon?” This way to ap-
proach the problem, however, has proven unsuccessful. “… its exclusive ontological focus is
perhaps what keeps the mind-body problem unsolved, even after a century of groundbreaking
work in the brain and behavioral sciences.” (40) So, Bickle claims, it might turn out to be useful
to change focus – to suggest that the core problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of
whether psychology can be reduced to neurobiology. “I will refer to this proposal as the inter-
theoretic-reduction reformulation of the mind-body problem, or for short, the IR
reformulation.” (41) But isn’t this way of reformulating the mind-body problem a way of
changing topics? Bickle seems to think that it is not since serious ways of dealing with ontologi-
cal questions have to take into account the results of scientific research. Science comes first,
ontology follows in its wake. “The defensible ontological conclusion becomes secondary to and
dependent on this logically prior issue of intertheoretic reduction.” (41) This also is the reason
why, according to Bickle, “each traditional solution [of the mind-body problem] gets reformu-
lated as prediction concerning the reductive fate of folk psychology.” (45)
This, however, is not quite true. Not all ontological questions can be answered in this way. The
relation between ontology and intertheoretic reduction is a little less tight than Bickle thinks. Let
us start at the roots. Of course, there can be no doubt that, from the very beginning, proponents
of the identity theory claimed that there was a special relation between the question of whether
mental properties are identical to physical properties and the question of whether psychology
can be reduced to neurobiology. One reason for this view resided in the examples of successful
property identity claims that the proponents of the identity theory relied on. Why is temperature
identical to mean molecular energy? The answer seemed to be straightforward: Because ther-
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modynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics. But why is this? What is the rationale that
allows us to draw conclusions about identity claims from facts about intertheoretic reduction?
This is an important question that has only been addressed by very few philosophers. Joseph
Levine is one of them.
In his 1983 paper “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap” Levine gives a two step an-
swer to this question. If we were asked what temperature is we would, according to Levine, give
an answer like this: Temperature is the property of bodies that causes certain sensations of
warmth and coldness in us, and that causes the mercury column of thermometers that come into
contact with these bodies to rise or fall, and that causes certain chemical reactions and so forth.
In other words, we would characterize temperature by its causal role alone. This is the first step.
But this by itself would not suffice. A second step is needed:
„… our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it is that something like the motion of mole-
cules could play the causal role we associate with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery of the essential
nature of heat, its causal role … exhausts our notion of it. Once we understand how this causal role is carried out
there is nothing more we need to understand. (Levine 1983, 357)
Thus, we derive the truth of the claim
(1) Temperature is identical to mean molecular energy
from two premises:
(2) Temperature is exclusively characterized by its causal role.
(3) Physics can make it intelligible that the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of a gas
plays exactly this causal role.3
But if these are the reasons for our acceptance of the identity claim (1) what has intertheoretic
reduction to do with it? The answer is obvious. It is exactly the fact that thermodynamics can be
reduced to statistical mechanics and the way this reduction is carried out which demonstrates
that mean molecular energy plays the very causal role by which temperature is characterized.
Intertheoretic reduction is the ordinary means by which we establish the truth of propositions
like (3).
At the same time, this helps us to see the importance and the limitations of intertheoretic reduc-
tion with regard to questions concerning the ontological status of properties. If we are concerned
with properties that are exclusively characterized by their  causal role, intertheoretic reduction is
at center stage. For causal roles are implicitly defined by the laws which state how things behave
that have the properties in question. The causal role which characterizes a property F is thus
captured by the theory TR which comprises all these laws. To show that – let us say – X plays
exactly the causal role by which property F is characterized, therefore, is to deduce a smooth
analogue T*R in Hooker’s sense from a general theory TB about X.
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Things are very different, however, if we are concerned with properties that are not exclusively
characterized by their causal role. Think, for example, of sensations like pain that at least seem
to be characterized also by their phenomenal qualities. In these cases intertheoretic reduction is
not enough. Let us assume, for example, that TR is that part of folk psychology or scientific psy-
chology which tells us how people behave that are in pain. And let us assume further that we are
able to deduce a smooth analogue T*R from neurobiology. This, of course, would show that 260
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there is a neural state N that has exactly the causal role pain has. But it would not show that pain
can, in an ontologically interesting sense, be reduced to N. This would be shown only if we were
also able to deduce from neurobiology that being in N has all the characteristic phenomenal
qualities of pain. Some philosophers claim that the insolubility of the mind-body problem stems
from the fact that this is impossible for reasons of principle. But let us sidestep this issue. With
regard to my argument it is sufficient to understand that what has to be shown in the case of pain
cannot be shown by theory reduction alone. Theory reduction thus is not the general means by
which all questions concerning the ontological status of mental properties can be answered.
I would like to round off these considerations by a general statement about what, in my mind,
the mind-body problem amounts to. Identity is not the issue. Concerning the question about the
ontological status of mental properties the problem is whether these properties fit into a general
naturalistic world view. And this – in C.D. Broad’s terms4 – is the problem of whether mental
properties are emergent or reductively explainable.5 If a system S is made up of physical con-
stituents C1, …, Cn arranged in manner R, i.e., if S has microstructure [C1, …, Cn; R],  a property
F of S is reductively explainable iff it follows from the fundamental laws of nature that all sys-
tems with this microstructure have all features that are characteristic of F. F is emergent iff it is
a true, but not fundamental, law of nature that all systems with microstructure [C1, …, Cn; R]
have F although F is not reductively explainable.
Therefore, on the assumption that F is exclusively characterized by a causal role, F is reduc-
tively explainable iff it follows from the fundamental laws applying to the constituents C1, …,
Cn that the microstructure [C1, …, Cn; R] plays exactly this role. And if TR is the theory that
expresses the causal role of F this amounts to nothing else than to deduce a smooth analogue
T*R from the theory TB which comprises the fundamental laws. Thus, we arrive at the same
result again: With regard to properties that are exclusively characterized by their causal role in-
tertheoretic reduction is decisive. If, however, F has characteristic features that go beyond causal
roles, intertheoretic reduction does not suffice. For, at least in general, intertheoretic reduction
will not be able to reveal whether systems with a certain microstructure have these features, too.
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